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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the problem of  identity and difference in Hegel and Heidegger and thereby 
attempts to shed light on the relationship between the critique of  metaphysics and the critique of  
modernity. Both Hegel and Heidegger, it is argued, investigate identity and difference in relation to the 
problem of  self-consciousness or subjectivity within the historical context of  modernity. Their 
respective critiques of  modern subject-metaphysics can for this reason also be viewed as critiques of  
the philosophical foundations of  modernity. Two paths or lines of  inquiry can be identified: Hegel’s 
dialectical-speculative path, which attempts to supersede modern subject-metaphysics in favour of  
speculative philosophy, the form of  thought adequate to the experience of  freedom in modernity; and 
Heidegger’s ontopoetic path, which attempts to detach itself  from metaphysics in order to usher in a 
‘non-metaphysical’ experience of  technological modernity. These two paths are explored through a 
critical dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger as a way of  showing the relationship between the 
critique of  metaphysics and the critique of  modernity.
Part I of  the thesis considers the philosophical background to the identity/difference problem 
and its relation to the principle of  self-consciousness within modern philosophy. The early Hegel’s 
encounter with Kant and Fichte is explored as an attempt to criticise the (theoretical and practical) 
deficiencies of  the philosophy of  reflection. Part II considers Hegel’s positive project in the 
Phenomenology of  Spirit, in particular the theme of  intersubjective recognition and its significance for 
theorising self-consciousness in modernity. Hegel’s critique of  substance- and subject-metaphysics is 
examined in the Science of  Logic, which integrates the logic of  identity and difference within the 
threefold Conceptual unity of  universal, particular, and individual. Part III then turns to Heidegger’s 
explicit confrontation with Hegel, discussing Heidegger’s project of  posing anew the question of  
Being, and examining in detail Heidegger’s “Cartesian-egological” reading of  the Phenomenology. The 
later Heidegger’s “non-metaphysical” or ontopoetic evocation of  identity and difference is further 
explored in light of  Heidegger’s critical engagement with the nihilism of  technological modernity. In 
conclusion, it is suggested that the critical dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger can open up new 
paths for exploring the problem of  freedom in modernity.
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Introduction
 
Dialectical  history  is  multiple  and  complex,  not  as  its  critics  would  have  it,  unitary  and  simply 
progressive; it suspends the history of  philosophy within the philosophy of  history, and the philosophy 
of  history within the history of  philosophy.
Gillian Rose (1984, 3).
 
The problem of  identity and difference is one of  the most ancient concerns of  philosophy, reaching 
back to Plato and Aristotle and even further to Heraclitus and Parmenides.[1] At the same time, the 
problem of  identity and difference is also a pervasive issue in much contemporary philosophy and 
critical theory.[2] The philosophical background and provenance of  this problem nonetheless remains 
rather obscure.[3] Few contemporary theorists explicitly acknowledge the roots of  the philosophical 
discourse  of  identity  and  difference  or  explain  its  critical  significance  for  the  understanding  of  
modernity.[4] Indeed,  contemporary  discourses  on  identity  and  difference,  with  their  associated 
critiques of  modern subjectivity, draw on a philosophical problematic stretching back at least to post-
Kantian idealism. In what follows, I shall argue that two of  the most important thinkers within the 
effective history of  this  problem have been Hegel  and Heidegger,  thinkers whose critiques of  the 
metaphysics of  modernity have shaped the discourse of  identity and difference up to the present day.
            The following thesis is devoted to analysing the problem of  identity and difference in Hegel 
and Heidegger, and attempts by means of  this analysis to shed light on the contemporary philosophical 
discourse on identity and difference. Hegel and Heidegger engage, I argue, in a critical thinking of  
identity and difference that is  at the same time a critique of  the metaphysical-conceptual bases of  
modernity.  Hegel’s  suspension  [Aufhebung]  of  metaphysics  within  speculative  logic  aims  to  “give 
difference its due” by overcoming the formalism and dichotomies of  the analytic understanding; his 
critique of  modern metaphysics aims to develop categories appropriate to the intersubjectivity of  Spirit 
in modernity. Heidegger’s overcoming of  modern metaphysics, on the other hand, seeks to prepare a 
“non-metaphysical”  thinking  of  the  identity  and  difference  between  human  beings  and  Being.  In 
attempting to think the truth of  Being as appropriative event [Er-eignis]—the mutual belonging together 
of  humans and Being—Heidegger prepares for a thinking beyond the completed subject-metaphysics 
of  technological modernity.
            In each case, however, critical questions can be raised about the success of  these Hegelian and 
Heideggerian  projects.  I  shall  consider  whether  Hegel  consistently  carries  out  this  programme of  
preserving difference throughout his system and to what extent difference as particularity is integrated 
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into identity  as  universality.  Furthermore,  I  shall  argue that  Heidegger’s  interpretation of  Hegelian 
phenomenology and logic as the completion of  subject-metaphysics ultimately remains one-sided. For 
it fails to adequately address the intersubjective constitution of  Spirit and the complex threefold unity 
of  universality,  particularity,  and individuality in Hegel’s  Logic of  the Concept. Finally,  I argue that 
Heidegger’s  “non-metaphysical”  or  ontopoetic thinking  of  the  mutual  appropriation  between human 
being and Being cannot fully articulate or account for the relationship between (the non-metaphysically 
conceived) identity and difference. In sum, my contention is that exploring the critical dialogue between 
Hegel  and  Heidegger  can  help  uncover  the  roots  of  the  philosophical  discourse  of  identity  and 
difference, show the significance of  their respective critiques of  subjectivity, and open up new paths for 
thinking the problem of  metaphysics in modernity.
 
The Hegel-Heidegger relationship
Philosophical interest in the relationship between the thought of  Hegel and Heidegger has recently 
become  a  focus  of  scholarly  research  in  the  English  speaking  world.[5] The  problem  of  the 
relationship between these thinkers, moreover, has a long and interesting history.[6] Heidegger himself  
devoted a lecture course in 1930-31 to the reading of  the “Consciousness” section of  the Phenomenology  
of  Spirit, and his 1942-43 essay, “Hegel’s Concept of  Experience,” is well known. In addition, the later 
Heidegger returned to Hegel in essays such as “Hegel and the Greeks,” and attempted to come to 
terms with Hegel in his 1957 essay on “The Onto-theological Constitution of  Metaphysics”.[7] From 
1933-1939, Alexandre Kojève’s famous lectures on Hegel combined elements from Heidegger’s  Being  
and Time, particularly the role of  finitude and time, with a Marxist interpretation of  Hegel’s account of  
the struggle for recognition, to produce an original interpretation that was to have a profound influence 
on the  post-war generation of  French philosophy.[8] Hegel  and Heidegger significantly  influenced 
Sartre’s  Being and Nothingness—particularly his analyses of  nothingness and negation, in-itself  and for-
itself,  facticity,  temporality,  and freedom as transcendence—while interest  continues in the Sartrean 
critique of  Hegel’s and Heidegger’s accounts of  the problem of  the Other.[9] Gadamer’s hermeneutics
—as a “mediation” between Hegel and Heidegger—draws on the Hegelian concept of  the historicity 
of  Spirit  and combines  this  with the  Heideggerian conception of  hermeneutic  phenomenology in 
order to develop a hermeneutics of  the historicity of  understanding and language.[10] German Critical 
Theory was also significantly shaped by the philosophical appropriation and critique of  Hegel and 
Heidegger.[11] Adorno’s  Negative  Dialectics developed  an  “immanent  critique”  of  Heideggerian 
ontology and of  Hegelian philosophy of  history in the service of  a negative dialectic aiming to uncover 
the conceptual roots  of  domination in identity thinking and to preserve the non-identical from its 
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destruction  within  administered  society.[12] Contemporary  French  philosophy,  and  in  particular 
Derridian deconstruction,  owes a great debt to both Hegel and Heidegger as powerful exponents of  
the struggle with the metaphysics of  presence and as opening up a thinking of  difference as such.[13] 
A number of  Derrida’s texts have critically explored the Hegel-Heidegger relationship in the context of  
deconstructing metaphysics.[14] 
            In  addition  to  this  more  general  appropriation  and  transformation  of  Hegelian  and 
Heideggerian themes, there is also a considerable history of  explicit studies of  the Hegel-Heidegger 
relationship. Although most of  these works, both in German and English, have appeared since the 
1960s[15] and in particular in the last two decades, among the earliest studies specifically devoted to the 
Hegel-Heidegger relationship is a 1953 work by Jan van der Meulen. The latter is a comparative study 
that seeks to articulate the philosophical encounter between Hegel and Heidegger according to the 
poles of  conflictuality and contradiction as fundamental determinations of  Being. The basis or mediating 
middle [Mitte] for this philosophical encounter is the problem of  the “Logos as the truth of  Being” 
(van der Meulen 1953, 7). Of  particular interest in this study is the discussion of  the Hegelian and 
Heideggerian conceptions of  truth, the account of  the difference between Hegel and Heidegger in 
relation to temporality,  and the examination of  the problem of  ontological  difference in regard to 
nature and history.  Van der Meulen’s  “mediating” interpretation,  which combines a critique of  the 
Heideggerian  reading  of  Hegel  with  an  immanent  critique  of  Hegel  drawing  on  insights  from 
Heidegger, sets the pattern for many of  the comparative Hegel-Heidegger studies which follow. These 
can be classified, I suggest, according to two main problem-complexes: the overcoming of  metaphysics and 
the critique of  modernity. Most studies emphasise one aspect rather than the other, but both need to be 
acknowledged if  we  are  to  comprehend the  significance  of  the  confrontation  between Hegel  and 
Heidegger.
 
Hegel-Heidegger: Overcoming Metaphysics
A tradition of  studies on the Hegel-Heidegger relationship has emerged which take their orientation 
from the topic of  overcoming metaphysics. The most well known and influential of  these is Werner 
Marx’s  Heidegger und die Tradition, published in 1961, which one commentator describes as “the most 
complete study to date of  Heidegger’s relation to Hegel”.[16] Marx develops a detailed interpretation 
of  Heidegger’s confrontation with the tradition of  substance-metaphysics, for which “the question of  
Being  [Sein]  amounts  to  the  question  of  essence  [Wesen]”  (1971,  4),  and  which  finds  its  roots  in 
Aristotle’s  conception  of  essence/substance  [ousia].  The  basic  ousiological  traits  of  Being—namely 
selfsameness,  necessity,  “eternalness,”  and  intelligibility—are transformed with  Hegel  into  the  self-
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ordering and circular movement of  thought as a dialectical process. Hegel’s  metaphysics,  on Marx’s 
reading, represents the culmination of  the Aristotelian “ousiological” tradition, since Hegel’s thinking 
“was still determined by the initial starting point of  Being as substance and subject” (1971, 10). For 
Marx, Hegel’s speculative account of  the meaning of  Being, Essence, and Concept thus provides an 
illuminating contrast with Heidegger’s radical destruction of  the ousiological tradition of  metaphysics. 
Heidegger’s revolution consists in posing “the question of  Being no longer as a question about beings,” 
and thinking Being “no longer  in the sense of  ousia  as substance” (Marx 1971, 5). This break with the 
metaphysical tradition means that Heidegger opens a path for thinking an “other” essence along with 
the possibility of  the arrival of  the new in history.
            The  significance  of  Hegel,  according  to  Marx,  lies  in  marking  the  culmination  of  the 
“metaphysics  of  light”—the  Greek  vision  of  the  total  intelligibility  of  ousia grasped  through  the 
illumination  of  noesis—but  also  the  acknowledgement  of  a  “realm  of  darkness  in  the  form  of  
“untruth,” “error,” “evil,” and death (1971, 54-5). In the struggle between the light and the darkness, 
the  occurrence  of  truth  and  untruth,  Hegel  ultimately  gives  predominance  to  the  traditional 
“metaphysics  of  light”  in  the  progressive  dialectical  movement  of  thought.[17] Although  Hegel 
prepares the transition to Heidegger’s “other” thinking of  Being, beyond the ousiological tradition, 
Hegel’s  commitment  to  the  selfsameness  and  total  intelligibility  of  Being  leaves  no  room for  the 
occurrence  of  “the  new,”  the  unforeseen  emergence  of  difference  in  history.  Compared  with 
Heidegger,  Marx  concludes,  “Hegel  constructs  his  doctrine  of  subjectivity  on  the  basis  of  the 
traditional doctrine of  substance,” with the unfortunate result that the relationship between Being and 
the human essence “remains in principle ‘uncreative’” (1971, 82).[18]
            The  possibility  of  thinking  the  “advent  of  the  new”—or  unforeseen  difference  in  the 
occurrence  of  Being  as  history—is  an  important  issue  in  the  confrontation  between  Hegel  and 
Heidegger. Indeed, Marx describes this issue as defining our “present need of  philosophy”, namely, to 
think “the essence of  essence in such a way that the advent of  the new is found to be possible” (1971, 
244). Marx reveals here his underlying commitment to Heidegger’s project. For it was Heidegger, Marx 
contends,  who  first  initiated  this  urgent  question,  one  which  has  been  largely  neglected  by 
contemporary philosophy (1971, 243). In this regard, Marx’s study, which I shall address in more detail 
in later chapters, provides a paradigm for numerous recent studies that discuss the Hegel-Heidegger 
relationship from the viewpoint  of  the  problem of  overcoming  metaphysics. Hegel  and Heidegger are 
presented as decisive figures in philosophical accounts of  the overcoming of  the metaphysical tradition, 
but in many cases a tacitly “Heideggerian” interpretation is assumed which characterises Hegel as a 
metaphysician of  subjectivity whose conception of  the subject is ultimately based on the traditional 
doctrine of  substance.[19]
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            Werner Marx’s study is a paradigm of  the approach to the Hegel-Heidegger relationship centred 
on the problem of  overcoming metaphysics. This approach strongly emphasises the shared problematic 
between Hegel and Heidegger—overcoming the metaphysical tradition and forging a new mode of  
thought—and contrasts both thinkers according to the extent to which they successfully overcome 
metaphysics or else remain captured within it. For Marx, Hegel remains within the ousiological tradition 
of  the  “metaphysics  of  light”,  while  Heidegger—for  all  the  dangers  his  thinking  presents[20]—
successfully overcomes the light in favour of  the obscurity of  the event of  Being. Taken on its own, 
however, this approach displays a certain “one-sidedness” evident in the lack of  any account of  the 
historical-cultural  significance  of  the  critique  of  metaphysics.[21] Marx  does  not  address  the 
significance  of  this  overcoming  of  metaphysics  in  relation  to  Hegel’s  and  Heidegger’s  respective 
critiques of  modernity. This point is significant if  we accept, as Habermas remarks, that Hegel was the first 
philosopher to develop an explicit concept of  modernity, and to grasp the problem of  modernity’s self-
reassurance as the fundamental problem of  his own philosophy.[22] The relation between the critique of  
metaphysics and the critique of  modernity in Hegel and Heidegger must be examined further if  we are 
to understand the significance of  their attempts to overcome the metaphysical tradition.[23] 
            Two recent  examples  of  this  “metaphysical”  approach to  the  Hegel-Heidegger  encounter, 
centred on the topic of  overcoming metaphysics, are the studies by Dennis Schmidt (1988) and Karin 
de Boer (2000). Each author addresses the issue of  overcoming metaphysics from the viewpoint of  a 
specific organising theme or problem in Hegel and Heidegger: the meaning of  the finite in the case of  
Schmidt, and the meaning of  temporality in the case of  de Boer. Each author also adopts what one could 
call a “Heideggerian” version of  the reconstruction of  the history of  metaphysics and of  Hegel’s role 
in the culmination of  the metaphysical tradition, although each at the same time is acutely aware of  the 
problems associated with construing the history of  metaphysics as a unified “tradition”.[24] Moreover, 
each author is concerned to avoid the problem of  presenting the confrontation between Hegel and 
Heidegger as though it were simply a matter of  competing “positions” that one might compare and 
contrast. For this reason, both studies thematise a common problem or topic in the dialogue between 
Hegel and Heidegger, but reconstruct this dialogue from a largely “Heideggerian” perspective.
            Schmidt’s inquiry takes the problem of  the finite—“speaking and thinking the meaning of  the 
finite” (1988, xiii)—to be that which Hegel and Heidegger attempt to think in a manner that challenges 
the metaphysical tradition. In rediscovering the meaning of  the finite as the first topic of  philosophy, 
Hegel and Heidegger each claim thereby to bring that tradition to its end. But whereas Hegel attempts 
“to think the finite in its infinite inner relation to the infinite” (1988, 15), that is, to overcome the ‘false’ 
metaphysical conception of  the “finitised infinite” in favour of  the true infinite of  speculative reason, 
Heidegger abandons the infinite  as  a  metaphysical  ground or principle in order to think the finite 
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happening of  Being as such. In this sense, the confrontation between Hegel and Heidegger concerns 
the issue of  overcoming metaphysics—where the latter has traditionally implied a transcendence of  the 
finite in favour of  the ideal or unconditioned (1988, 3)—in order to legitimate “a truly nonmetaphysical 
form of  philosophical discourse” (1988, 12).
            Indeed, Schmidt’s purpose in studying the Hegel-Heidegger confrontation is not to correct the 
“mistakes” in  Heidegger’s  reading of  Hegel,  but to ask “just  how far  Heidegger has succeeded in 
undermining  the  all-embracing  infinity  of  the  Hegelian  system”  (1988,  17).  At  stake  in  such  a 
confrontation  is  the  question  whether  Heidegger  succeeds  in  his  basic  project  of  overcoming 
metaphysics.[25] In Schmidt’s  account,  Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel  provides the unifying 
thread  for  “the  issues  at  the  centre  of  contemporary  post-Hegelian,  and  specifically  postmodern, 
attempts to realize the overcoming of  philosophy as metaphysics.” (1988, 22). These “postmodern” 
concerns with the ubiquity of  the finite, and the plurality of  discourses concerning finite Being, emerge 
at the conclusion of  Schmidt’s inquiry. Heidegger partially succeeds in extricating his thought from 
Hegel’s  “circle  of  reflection,”  but  this  only  means  a  recovery  of  the original  topic  of  philosophy, 
namely thinking and living in “nonmetaphysical” harmony with the finite.
Schmidt’s detailed study of  the various texts comprising Heidegger’s critique of  Hegel follows 
their chronological and thematic development from section 82 of  Being and Time to the 1958 essay in 
Wegmarken on “Hegel and the Greeks”. As a result, the dialogue between them tends to be dominated 
by Heidegger’s focus on the “ontological”  aspects  of  Hegelian phenomenology and logic,  and the 
Heideggerian, rather than Hegelian, understanding of  the concepts of  the finite and the infinite.[26] 
Although Schmidt acknowledges that the significance of  Heidegger’s overcoming of  metaphysics is 
connected with the problems of  modernity and postmodernity,[27] there is  no elaboration of  this 
connection or of  the pertinence of  the topic of  the finite for the experience of  modernity. It is not just 
the overcoming of  metaphysics,  I would suggest,  but rather the relationship  between  the critique of  
metaphysics  and  the  critique  of  modernity  which  sets  the  agenda  for  much  critical  discussion  in 
contemporary continental philosophy.
            Karin  de  Boer’s  recent  work,  Thinking  in  the  Light  of  Time,  develops  further  the  topic  of  
Heidegger’s  critical  encounter  with  Hegel,  and  does  so  within  the  context  of  a  systematic 
reconstruction  of  Heidegger’s  thinking  of  temporality.  Like  Schmidt,  de  Boer  adopts  Heidegger’s 
critique of  Hegel as a unifying thread in her account of  Heidegger’s confrontation with metaphysics: 
on  the  one  hand,  Heidegger’s  Hegel  interpretation  serves  to  elucidate  what  is  intended  by  the 
Heideggerian  “deconstruction  of  metaphysics,”  while  on  the  other,  Heidegger’s  work  “will  be 
interpreted from the outset against the background of  Hegel” (2000, 4). Unlike Schmidt, however, she 
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eschews chronological  and comparative  approaches  in  favour of  a  thematic study of  the unity of  
Heidegger’s thought. This unity is provided by the problem of  temporality as the principle underlying 
Heidegger’s  deconstruction  of  metaphysics  and  of  Hegel  as  a  key  thinker  of  the  culmination  of  
metaphysics.[28] 
            Part III of  de Boer’s text is specifically devoted to the Hegel-Heidegger confrontation in which 
“the projective preconception guiding Hegel’s philosophy” is at stake (2000, 197). Heidegger, according 
to de Boer, must show that Hegel fails to meet the “total absence of  presuppositions” essential to the 
formation of  philosophical science. This unthematised presupposition, which provides the basis of  
Heidegger’s interpretation of  Hegel, is an experience of  temporality that Hegel is unable to integrate 
into the speculative system. De Boer admits that Heidegger himself  does not explicitly thematise the 
decisive role of  temporality in Hegel, so that this thematisation must be carried out as part of  her own 
systematic reconstruction of  Heidegger’s critique of  metaphysics (2000, 199). For this reason, careful 
attention is given to Heidegger’s critique of  the relationship between time and spirit in §82 of  Being and 
Time.[29] Indeed, one of  de Boer’s key theses is that Heidegger’s philosophical method is based on the 
threefold structure of  originary temporality, and that this provides a basis to critique Hegel’s threefold 
movement of  the Concept—from undifferentiatedness, the positing of  a difference, to sublation of  
this  difference  in  a  higher  unity—as  a  movement  which  privileges  the  Present  over  the  other 
dimensions of  temporality.[30]
            The question of  method can be addressed further in this context. As de Boer notes, both Hegel 
and Heidegger considered external comparison “to be an inferior mode of  comprehension” (2000, 
200). Like Schmidt, de Boer adopts a “Heideggerian” perspective, using Heidegger’s critique of  Hegel 
to illuminate Heidegger rather than Hegel. Once again, the legitimacy of  Heidegger’s critique of  Hegel 
tends to be assumed in order to clarify Heidegger’s project of  overcoming metaphysics: “I will rather 
use Heidegger’s interpretation of  Hegel to show how Heidegger’s thinking springs from metaphysics 
and turns itself  against this origin, without turning back to it, yet equally without standing outside it. 
The history of  Heidegger’s discussion with Hegel,  ...  will  be ordered by reading Heidegger’s  actual 
interpretations of  Hegel in light of  what I consider to be the principle underlying those interpretations.” 
(2000,  200).  This  underlying  principle,  as  remarked,  is  “the  temporality  that  grounds  every 
understanding of  being” (2000, 200), which metaphysics, including Hegel, can neither recognise nor 
modify. The question of  the validity of  Heidegger’s interpretation of  Hegel is thereby minimised or 
subordinated to the issue of  Heidegger’s overcoming of  metaphysics in the light of  his thinking of  
temporality.[31] To be sure, de Boer tries to interpret Hegel charitably and to give as much attention to 
the omissions as to the emphases in Heidegger’s Hegel interpretation (2000, 198, 200). Nonetheless, de 
Boer’s adoption of  this “Heideggerian” perspective leaves ambiguous decisive questions concerning the 
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Hegel-Heidegger encounter.[32]
            Finally, de Boer’s account of  the Hegel-Heidegger confrontation returns us to the issue of  the 
“one-sidedness” of  the “metaphysical” approach. As with Schmidt, de Boer acknowledges a common 
underlying  motivation  for  the  radical  confrontation  with  Hegel  and  the  project  of  overcoming 
metaphysics,  but  leaves  obscure  the  context  and  significance  of  this  motivation  (2000,  198).  The 
thematisation of  temporality does not include the question of  historicity or the cultural-historical need 
that  would  motivate  the  overcoming  of  metaphysics.  As  I  shall  argue  further,  this  omission  is 
symptomatic of  the “forgetting” of  the historical-cultural condition of  modernity as the source of  
Hegel’s  and  Heidegger’s  respective  projects  for  overcoming  metaphysics.  It  suggests  the  need  to 
acknowledge the philosophical problem of  modernity in order to supplement the one-sidedness of  the 
“metaphysical” approach.
 
Hegel-Heidegger: The Critique of  Modernity
Another approach to the Hegel-Heidegger relationship has emerged which takes as its theme Hegel’s 
and Heidegger’s contributions to the philosophical critique of  modernity. Indeed, Hegel is one of  the first 
thinkers to develop a philosophical concept of  modernity as an historical, social, cultural, and political 
constellation  of  knowledge,  normativity,  institutions,  and  autonomous  subjectivity.[33] Habermas 
states the problem succinctly: Hegel was the first philosopher to investigate the problem of  modernity’s 
need for a self-generated normativity detached from any received body of  traditions, institutions, or 
practices  of  the  past  (Habermas  1984:  16).  Hegel  raises  modernity’s  need  for  “self-reassurance” 
[Selbstvergewisserung] concerning its self-generated normativity to the level of  a philosophical problem 
(1984, 16). Indeed, for Hegel, Habermas remarks, the task of  philosophy is that “of  grasping  its own 
time—and for him that means the modern age—in thought” (1984, 16).
            Recent  studies  thematising  the  problem of  modernity  in  the  Hegel-Heidegger  relationship 
include  those  by  Robert  Pippin  (1991)  and  David  Kolb  (1986).  For  both  authors,  Hegel’s  critical 
legitimation of  modernity, and Heidegger’s deconstructive overcoming of  its metaphysical origins, have 
fundamentally shaped the contemporary discourse of  modernity.[34] The critique of  modernity, they 
argue,  is  crucial  for  understanding  not  only  Hegel’s  suspension  of  metaphysics  but  Heidegger’s 
confrontation with Hegel as the metaphysician of  modernity  par excellence. On the one hand, Hegel’s 
suspension of  metaphysics is motivated by the need to overcome the “dissatisfactions” generated by 
social  and  cultural  modernity,  the  need  to  construct  appropriate  categories  in  order  to  think  the 
complexity of  modern subjectivity and social institutions. On the other, Heidegger’s confrontation with 
the  metaphysical  tradition  is  motivated  by  the  need  to  overcome  the  nihilism  of  technological 
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modernity through a recovery of  the obliterated sense of  Being. This contextualisation of  the Hegel-
Heidegger  relationship  within  the  philosophical  discourse  of  modernity  helps  to  illuminate  the 
significance their shared project of  overcoming metaphysics.
            David Kolb’s comparative study examines the critique of  modernity presented by Hegel and 
Heidegger, two thinkers distinguished by their “refusal to take as final the categories of  modernity’s 
standard self-description” (1986, xi).  On the basis of  their  respective accounts of  modernity,  Kolb 
constructs “a critique of  each from the standpoint of  the other” in order to take “advantage of  the 
strategy  shared  by  Hegel  and  Heidegger  without  falling  into  the  traps  that  their  mutual  criticism 
illuminates” (1986, xv). According to Kolb, Hegel develops a critique of  romantic subjectivity and of  
modern economic institutions or “civil society” together with a comprehensive interpretation of  the 
“state” as a rational community (1986, xiii). Kolb emphasises, moreover, the role of  Hegelian Logic as 
grounding  the  critique  of  modernity.  Contra  Taylor  and  contemporary  “non-metaphysical” 
interpretations,[35] Kolb  argues  that  Hegel’s  criticisms  of  modernity  cannot  be  fully  understood 
“unless seen with their logical grounding” (1986, xii-xiv). Indeed, Hegel’s critique of  “civil society” is 
based  on  the  dialectical  criticism  of  basic  categories  of  modernity—such  as  form  and  content, 
universal and particular—along with Hegel’s  speculative account of  the “absolute form” of  Spirit’s 
movement (1986, xiii). Hegel then applies these mediations in the transition from civil society to state 
in order to show “how the typical modern dichotomies can be overcome in a form of  life that is to 
blend the best of  ancient substantive community and modern freedom” (1986, xiii).
            Kolb’s discussion of  Heidegger’s critique of  modernity is centred on the confrontation with 
modern  subjectivity  within  the  context  of  modern  technology.  This  critique  is  coupled  with 
Heidegger’s proposal concerning the possibility of  overcoming modern subjectivity in the thinking of  
the “propriative event” [Ereignis].  Heidegger’s confrontation with modernity,  Kolb remarks, aims to 
“put modern selfhood in its place,” and to explore the possibility of  dwelling in the modern world in 
ways other than “the activity of  manipulated manipulators, which our age assigns us to be” (1986, xiv). 
Hegel  and Heidegger  both agree  on the  prevalence  of  the  phenomenon of  empty  subjectivity  in 
modernity;  both would also agree,  Kolb claims,  that the modern search “for self-certitude through 
distance and manipulation ignores the basic conditions that make modern subjectivity possible at all” 
(1986, 203). However, both disagree, Kolb argues, “on the extent to which individualism is essential to 
modern  subjectivity”  (1986,  203).  Whereas  Hegel  affirms  the  historical  realisation  of  individual 
freedom  and  autonomy  in  modernity,  Heidegger  sees  the  latter  as  caught  within  the  destructive 
paradigm of  self-willing subjectivity.
Indeed, Heidegger emphasises more than Hegel the domineering aspects of  modernity, namely 
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“the will to power and the levelling of  all modes of  being to the one realm of  presentable objects and 
standing reserve” (1986, 203). Although Hegel presented similar criticisms in the PhG, Kolb notes, 
these dealt with modern citizenship and freedom, irony and inwardness, rather than technology and the 
will  to  power  (Kolb  1986,  203).  There  are  doubtless  historical  reasons  for  this  difference,  which 
suggests that a comparison of  Hegel and Heidegger on the problem of  technology runs the risk of  
anachronism. Nonetheless, Heidegger’s criticism of  Hegel’s conception of  modernity amounts to the 
claim that “Hegel fails to understand the importance of  will in the modern age because Hegel’s own 
solution for the problems of  modernity is itself  a hidden form of  subjectivity as will” (1986, 203). 
Kolb characterises the Heideggerian criticism as comprising three interconnected points: that Hegel 
remains  caught  within  the  metaphysical  determination  of  truth  as  correspondence  and  being  as 
constant available presence; that Hegel adheres to the modern interpretation of  being as self-certain 
subjectivity;  and consequently,  that Hegel fails  to overcome modernity because, in accordance with 
tradition, he “is destined to forget our real finitude” in the drive towards a reconciliation in rationality, 
and in fact exacerbates the “drive for self-coincidence, self-certainty, and total presence that lies at the 
root of  modern subjectivity and its will to power” (1986, 214).
We should note that this characterisation of  Heidegger’s position seems to undermine Kolb’s 
earlier claim that Hegel and Heidegger both agree on the critique of  empty subjectivity in modernity. 
Nonetheless, Kolb also takes issue with Heidegger’s claim that Hegel “remains within the traditions of  
Cartesian subjectivity and Western metaphysics,” arguing that, while Hegel remains committed to the 
basic metaphysical orientation towards grounds and presence, Hegel cannot be regarded as a “super-
Cartesian” (1986, 215).[36] On the other hand, Hegel would have a number of  possible criticisms to 
level at Heidegger: that Heidegger provides no “phenomenological” account, in the Hegelian sense, of  
the  connection  between  the  thinking  of  Being  and  various  phenomenological  figures  of  modern 
subjectivity;  and that  Heidegger’s  thinking  of  the  history  of  Being  reverts  to an evocation of  the 
immediacy and contingency of  what Being itself  grants us, without being able to supply a rational 
comprehension of  the necessity of  this history, or any determinate content for the mysterious “formal” 
event  of  appropriation.  While  Heidegger  suggests  that  there  is  a  mysterious  connection  between 
successive epochs within the West, this has more to do “with the wanderings of  errance [Irre]” than 
human agency, leaving human beings with little, if  any, role to play in the fate of  modernity (1986, 224). 
Heidegger fails to overcome modernity, Kolb contends, “because he remains caught on its principle, 
the separation of  formal process from content,” with the result that Heidegger ends up “by either 
locking us into a premodern world or reaffirming the ironic and distanced side of  modernity” (1986, 
228). Heidegger does not overcome the dichotomy between substantive tradition and formal rootless 
subjectivity so much as intensify their irresolvable oscillation (Kolb 1986, 228).
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            Apart  from  these  general  problems,  however,  the  crucial  question  between  Hegel  and 
Heidegger is “whether what makes modernity possible, the Sache for thinking, gives itself  or withdraws 
itself ” (1986, 210). At stake between Hegel and Heidegger is the question whether the “metaphysical” 
origin of  modernity is at all accessible, intelligible, and conceptually articulable. Does the “ground” of  
modernity give itself  as “withdrawing and lack of  totality or as presence, availability, and self-closure?” 
(1986,  210).  For  Hegel,  it  is  the  coming  to  presence  of  Spirit  allows  things  to  be  revealed;  for 
Heidegger, on the other hand, it is the withdrawal of  the propriative event (1986, 210). Such closure 
and self-presence, for Hegel, is what allows us to overcome the dichotomies of  modernity, while for 
Heidegger, it is what ensnares us further within the modern understanding of  Being that generates 
these dichotomies (1986, 210).
            Kolb’s critical  comparison sheds welcome light on the relationship between the critique of  
metaphysics and the critique of  modernity.  Moreover, Kolb identifies two decisive problems facing 
contemporary interpretations of  Hegel and Heidegger. The first point is that Hegel’s social, cultural, 
and political analyses must be thought in conjunction with his Logic, rather than excising the latter as 
unpalatable metaphysics. One must at least explain how one can endorse Hegel’s social and political 
analyses without reference to speculative Logic. For Kolb, this raises the question of  whether an “open 
Hegelianism”  is  possible,  an  interpretation  that  moves  away  from  the  Hegelian  emphasis  on 
metaphysical closure within the Logic, but nonetheless remains true to the spirit of  the Hegelian system 
as a whole.[37] The problem here, as I shall discuss later, is whether Hegelian Logic indeed implies or 
is identical with a metaphysical closure that subordinates difference or particularity. The second point is 
that Heidegger’s emphasis on the immediacy and unity of  what is granted in the propriative event, 
apart from any determinate content, means that it comes to resemble closely a quasi-transcendental 
formal  condition.  Heidegger  must  find  a  way  of  thinking  the  propriative  event  of  Being  without 
turning it into a metaphysical  arche, ground, or a purely formal condition. Heidegger remains caught, 
Kolb argues, between these alternatives, which can be rephrased in the terminology of  the ontological 
difference: does Heidegger’s thought of  the ontological difference involve the separation of  form and 
content and subsequent emphasis on the unity of  technology in modernity?[38] This question brings 
us to the heart of  the debate between Hegel and Heidegger: does Hegel complete the metaphysics of  
identity  and  obliteration  of  difference  in  modernity,  or  does  Heidegger,  despite  the  claims  for 
ontological  difference,  revert  to  a  “metaphysical”  emphasis  on  unity  and  identity,  coupled  with  a 
separation of  form from content, that Hegel had already exposed in his critique of  metaphysics and the 
diremptions of  modernity?   
            These questions are also raised in Robert Pippin’s study of  philosophical modernism and the 
dispute between Hegel’s critical legitimation and Heidegger’s deconstructive overcoming of  modernity. 
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While consonant with aspects of  the Habermasian account of  modernity, Pippin rejects Habermas’ 
criticism  that  the  mature  Hegel  abandons  intersubjectivity  and  returns  to  the  “philosophy  of  
consciousness” (1991, 170 fn.21). Far from returning to the subject-object paradigm, Hegel overcomes 
it  by radicalising, historicising, and completing the Kantian project of  developing a comprehensive 
account of  modern autonomy. Indeed, the central issue in philosophical modernism, argues Pippin, 
concerns  the  idea  of  rational  autonomy.  Being  modern  demands  a  radically  critical  attitude:  the 
“modern subject can rely only ‘on itself,’ its own spontaneous self-legislation, in determining the agenda 
of  an age freed from dogmatic dependence” (1991, 14). This project of  rational autonomy raises the 
question  of  what  normative  criteria—both  theoretical  and  practical—should  be  binding  for  such 
“collective  self-legislation,”  criteria  that  can no longer  be  prescribed by the  authority  of  tradition, 
recollected through Platonic metaphysics, or drawn from an immutable “human nature”. Hegel proves 
to  be  the  philosophical  modernist  par  excellence,  according  to  Pippin’s  thesis,  because  he  is  the 
philosopher  who  most  adequately  answers  the  challenges,  and  thinks  through  the  aporias,  of  
accounting for the modernist project of  rational autonomy (1991, 14-15).
            It is Heidegger, however, “who has formulated the most profound, disturbing, and influential 
criticism of  such a modern spirit,” (1991, 121) with critiques of  modern philosophers from Descartes, 
Kant, Hegel, and above all, Nietzsche.[39] Indeed, Heidegger’s reading of  Nietzsche provides a forum 
for examining the radical conclusions of  the “counter-modernist” project, one which sees modernity 
not  as  the  realisation  of  rational  autonomy  but  rather  as  the  epitome  of  technological  nihilism. 
Heidegger radicalises the Nietzschean critique of  modernity and recasts Nietzsche, along with Hegel, as 
enacting  the  completion  of  the  metaphysics  of  subjectivity.  In  this  sense,  the  fundamental 
philosophical issue at stake for Heidegger, argues Pippin, “is not historical discontinuity, or autonomy, 
or self-consciousness, or the will to truth; it is the meaning of  Being in modernity” (1991, 121).
            Modernity thus becomes a “metaphysical” problem for Heidegger; its historical inception is 
defined by a change in the meaning of  the beingness of  beings,  with the latter now construed as 
grounded  in  self-representing  subjectivity  (1991,  122).  The  defining  metaphysical  characteristic  of  
modernity, as the age of  the world-image [Weltbildes], is that “man has risen up into the I-ness of  the ego  
cogito,”  an uprising  in  which  “all  that  is,  is  transformed into  object”  (HW 261/107).  The  modern 
“subjectivisation” of  Being is an event that completes modern metaphysics and ushers in the epoch of  
global  technology.  As  Pippin  observes,  Heidegger’s  characterisation  of  modernity  as  the  “age  of  
subjectness ... driving towards its consummation,” concludes with a diagnosis of  the utter nihilism of  
modernity: “The essence of  modernity is fulfilled,” Heidegger writes in the Nietzsche lectures, “in the 
age of  consummate meaninglessness” (1991, 122-123). Indeed, the significance of  Heidegger’s critique 
of  metaphysics can only be understood in the context of  “his sweeping account of  ‘the history of  
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Being’ and its ‘consummation’ in nihilism in modernity” (Pippin 1991, 123). 
            The dispute between Heidegger and modernity, for Pippin, concerns the apparently “epochal” 
character of  Heidegger’s thinking of  the consummation of  metaphysics. For Heidegger’s stance, Pippin 
contends,  inevitably  relies  on the  language of  metaphysical  “closure”  to define  the  completion of  
metaphysics in modern technology. Heidegger’s thinking of  Being as Ereignis—that would dissolve the 
nihilism  of  modernity  and  prepare  the  advent  of  a  new beginning—depends  essentially  on  such 
“closure,” since it is only the completion of  metaphysics that makes possible the experience of  Ereignis. 
Heidegger’s  famous  question  of  Being,  moreover,  itself  cannot  avoid  a  “genealogy”,  or  indeed 
“phenomenology,”  to  account  for  its  apparently  “binding”  character  for  us.[40] For  Heidegger’s 
evocation of  the saving power of  the event of  appropriation, “construed as a response to the aporiai of  
modernity, still betrays some hope for an intimation of  ultimacy, for a ‘clearing,’ for what is ‘outside’ of, 
and determines, human self-assertion” even within the mutual appropriation of  man and Being (1991, 
140).[41] From  the  Hegelian-idealist  viewpoint  Pippin  defends,  Heidegger  thus  reverts  to  a 
sophisticated version of  precritical metaphysics, an uncritical appeal to historical positivity.[42] Pippin’s 
thesis  thus  crystallises  into  the  following  claim:  that  Heidegger  fails  to  overcome  the  horizon  of  
modernity, or indeed modern metaphysics, and that this failure makes plausible a return to Hegel in 
order to think through the antinomies of  modernity.
            Pippin’s  arguments  for  the  connection  between  the  overcoming  of  metaphysics  and  the 
problem of  modernity, particularly in relation to Heidegger, deserve further scrutiny. For the moment, 
I simply note that his critique of  Heidegger is centred on the Nietzsche lectures of  the 1930s and 40s, 
which  may  not  be  representative  of  the  later  writings  on  metaphysics,  Ereignis,  and  technology. 
Moreover, the representative figure in Pippin’s discussion of  Heidegger’s confrontation with modernity 
is  Nietzsche rather  than Hegel,  whereas  the  underlying  argument  in  Pippin’s  account is  manifestly 
between the Heideggerian and the Hegelian versions of  the critique of  modernity. The explicit Hegel-
Heidegger  relationship,  however,  is  only  dealt  with  obliquely  from  viewpoint  of  Heidegger’s 
confrontation with Nietzsche,  although it  is  implicit  in  Pippin’s  defence of  Hegelian idealism as a 
plausible  version  of  philosophical  modernism.  Nonetheless,  Pippin  succinctly  formulates  the 
fundamental issue in the Hegel-Heidegger relationship: the critique of  Hegel as a metaphysician of  
identity  and Heidegger’s  claim to think difference as  such.[43] It  is  this  dispute—the problem of  
identity and difference in the context of  the metaphysics of  modernity—that I explore in the following 
study.
 
Identity and Difference: A Dialogical Approach
One  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  this  brief  overview  of  recent  studies  is  that  the  “thinking 
conversation” between Hegel and Heidegger has yet to be explored in a truly “dialogical” manner. 
Comparative  studies  of  Hegel  and  Heidegger  sometimes  presuppose  a  “neutral”  standpoint  that 
supposedly enables a straightforward adjudication between their  respective “positions” on a certain 
topic.[44] The  difficulty  is  that  this  approach overlooks  the  fundamental  differences  and tensions 
between the Hegelian and Heideggerian approaches to the hermeneutics of  the history of  philosophy.
[45] The  very  meaning  of  “metaphysics”  or  “modernity”—let  alone  Being,  Truth,  Identity,  or 
Difference—will  alter  significantly  depending  on  whether  one  is  thinking  within  a  “Hegelian”  or 
“Heideggerian”  dimension.  A  critical  hermeneutic  awareness  is  therefore  important  in  the 
interpretation and discussion of  the Hegel-Heidegger relationship. On the other hand, studies  that 
assume  a  “partisan”  position  can  suffer  from  an  uncritical  acceptance  of  the  Heideggerian 
interpretation of  Hegel, or else a risk misunderstanding the originality of  Heidegger’s confrontation 
with modern philosophy. This suggests the need for a “dialogical” approach to Hegel and Heidegger 
that attempts to mediate between these extremes on the basis of  a shared problematic.
            This raises the question of  method, especially pertinent to any investigation of  the Hegel-
Heidegger relationship. For one of  the shared themes emphasised both by Hegel and Heidegger is the 
need for a genuine philosophical encounter, rather than merely external criticism, between different 
projects devoted to the same matter or Sache. Hegel famously claimed that merely external refutation 
had no place in philosophy: the true refutation is the immanent critique that meets an opponent on his 
own  ground,  exposes  the  deficiencies  of  his  standpoint,  and  integrates  the  latter  into  a  more 
comprehensive unity.[46] Heidegger too famously described the conflict between thinkers as a “lover’s 
quarrel,” a conflict devoted to the task of  thinking the unthought of  a philosophical system in order to 
reveal its concealed truth. A number of  studies have explicitly thematised the problem of  method in 
staging the Hegel-Heidegger encounter.[47] Dominique Janicaud remarks that studies of  the Hegel-
Heidegger  case  “have  until  now tended to  be  too  limited  to  the  question  of  whether  Heidegger 
succeeded in ‘freeing’ himself  from Hegelian thought, as if  the status of  the latter were definitively 
settled and duly noted” (1999, 27). It is rather a matter of  attempting a philosophical dialogue between 
Hegel  and  Heidegger,  a  dialogue  between  “two  essential  bodies  of  thought,”  one  which  accepts 
Heidegger’s invitation “to begin a conversation [Gespräch] with Hegel” (ID 31/42), and does so in an 
open-ended inquiry aiming at enhancing our understanding of  the matter [Sache] at issue (1999, 27).
            In the spirit of  Janicaud’s comments, and of  Hegel’s and Heidegger’s own projects, I shall adopt 
a “critical-dialogical” approach to the Hegel-Heidegger relationship. By this I mean a critical inquiry 
into Hegel’s and Heidegger’s respective critiques of  metaphysics and modernity, oriented by the shared 
problematic of  identity and difference, and guided by the principle of  dialogical reciprocity. This does 
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not mean searching either for a unifying or harmonising reconciliation between Hegel and Heidegger, 
which dispels all critical doubts, or a dogmatic and monological refutation of  one thinker by the other, 
which  ignores  all  differences  in  their  philosophical  projects  and style.  Rather,  it  requires  a  critical 
investigation of  the philosophical problem at issue, oriented by an understanding of  its history, in order 
to situate the Hegel-Heidegger dialogue within the context of  an ongoing philosophical investigation 
of  modernity.  This  critical-dialogical  approach  embraces  the  conflict  and  disputation  required  by 
genuine philosophical inquiry; it is not only a dialogue oriented towards shared understanding through 
reciprocal exchange, but a critical contribution to a contemporary philosophical debate.
            It  is  my  contention  that  the  contemporary  discourse  of  identity  and  difference  finds  its 
philosophical origins primarily in Hegel and Heidegger, hence that a critical dialogue between these 
thinkers is necessary in order to understand their project of  overcoming metaphysics within the context 
of  modernity.  This dialogue on identity  and difference is  to be presented as an exercise in critical 
hermeneutics, that is, an inquiry not only conducted from within the shared horizon of  philosophical 
and  cultural  modernity,  but  one  which  also  makes  this  horizon  part  of  the  critical  inquiry  and 
questioning at issue. The “matter” or Sache of  the dialogue—the problem of  identity and difference—is 
a topic that is part of  our historical and cultural situation, and one which allows us to understand the 
significance  of  overcoming  metaphysics  within  the  context  of  modernity.  This  critical-dialogical 
approach also attempts to avoid two “monological” tendencies discernible in Hegel and Heidegger and 
their  relationship  to  the  history  of  philosophy:  the  risk  of  self-referential  closure,  which  turns  each 
previous thinker into a deficient and superseded stage of  one’s own philosophical trajectory towards 
final self-comprehension and systematic closure (Hegel); and the risk of  an  originary precomprehension, 
which takes each previous thinker as repeating an originary thesis or omission (concerning the event of  
Being) to which one has privileged but unarticulable access (Heidegger).
            In  conclusion  I  propose  that  investigating  the  problem  of  identity  and  difference  can 
interconnect the two dominant topics in studies of  the Hegel-Heidegger relationship—the overcoming 
of  metaphysics and the critique of  modernity—. This problem provides a basis for the critical dialogue 
between  Hegel  and  Heidegger  on  the  metaphysics  of  modernity.  In  this  manner,  the  risk  of  a 
“onesided” emphasis either on the overcoming of  metaphysics or on the problem of  modernity can be 
resolved within a more integrated and dialogical approach.
 
Design of  the Thesis
The following study aims to critically reconstruct the problem of  identity and difference in Hegel and 
Heidegger,  and  thereby  to  make  a  modest  contribution  to  the  philosophical  understanding  of  
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modernity. Hegel’s overcoming of  substance and subject-metaphysics, I shall argue, depends on the 
suspension or supersession of  the categories of  identity and difference—what Hegel called the logic of  
reflection—in  order  to  think  the  speculative  “identity-in-difference”  of  universal,  particular  and 
individual in the Hegelian Concept. In Heidegger’s case, overcoming metaphysics means to retrieve and 
think the obliterated ontological difference between Being and beings in order to evoke the experience 
of  the non-metaphysical unity or mutual appropriation of  human beings and Being. The critique of  
modernity,  for  Hegel,  is  motivated by  the  need to overcome the  atomised  subjectivity  and social-
cultural  diremptions  of  civil  society  in  favour  of  a  rational  totality  that  integrates  universality, 
particularity and concrete individuality. For Heidegger, the confrontation with modernity rests on the 
need  to  prepare  for  another,  non-metaphysical,  experience  of  the  event  of  Being  beyond  the 
instrumental ordering and objectification of  beings (and human beings) within modern technology. 
This critical-dialogical approach to Hegel and Heidegger, I suggest, will cast light on the origins and 
prospects of  the contemporary discourse of  identity and difference.
            Part I introduces the problem of  identity and difference and discusses how this problem figures 
in the early Hegel’s confrontation with Kantian and post-Kantian idealism. Chapter One develops a 
brief  historical-conceptual overview of  the problem of  identity and difference, focussing on its relation 
to  the  principle  of  self-consciousness  on  the  one  hand,  and  personal  identity  on  the  other.  The 
question of  the relationship between these ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’ forms of  self-consciousness 
sets the stage for Hegel’s contribution to the identity/difference problem. In brief, Hegel attempts to 
overcome Kantian formalism and dualism, and to construct a speculative conception of  reason and 
historical Spirit that integrates both identity and difference without falling into intractable dichotomies 
or dissolving particularity. Chapter Two analyses Hegel’s Differenzschrift and Glauben und Wissen in order 
to  show  how  Hegel  attempts  to  resolve  the  problem  of  the  formalism generated  by  an  abstract 
conception of  identity without difference belonging to the philosophy (and culture) of  reflection. The 
task of  unifying the critique of  metaphysics with the critique of  modernity is already discernible here in 
Hegel’s  confrontation  with  the  reflection  philosophy  of  subjectivity  and the  dirempted  culture  of  
reflection.  Hegel’s  thesis on identity,  difference,  and modern subjectivity  is  outlined as follows: the 
formal or abstract identity of  the analytic understanding [Verstand] is the principle of  modern culture, 
but this abstract identity,  and the formalism it  generates, leaves open the potential for domination-
relations between atomised subjects construed as objects of  manipulation. Hegel’s critique thus argues 
for a regeneration of  the sundered unity of  reason, a speculative identity of  identity and difference, and 
a conception of  freedom as the unity of  universal and particular which prefigures his later thought.[48]
            Part II of  this thesis examines Hegel’s engagement with these problems in the Phenomenology of  
Spirit and  Science of  Logic. Chapter Three is devoted to Hegel’s phenomenology of  the experience of  
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consciousness in its development towards self-comprehending Spirit. The focus of  my interpretation is 
on  the  theme  of  identity  and  difference  and  its  relationship  to  the  problem  of  intersubjective 
recognition throughout key sections in the PhG. These include the transition from consciousness to 
self-consciousness and the dialectic of  independent and dependent consciousness, the experience of  
the unhappy consciousness, and reason as the truth of  self-certainty. The problem of  reciprocal versus 
non-reciprocal  recognition,  I  shall  argue,  is  at  stake  throughout,  an issue that  Hegel  is  the  first  to 
explore but does not entirely develop. I suggest that Hegel’s  difficulties in fully accounting for the 
problem of  mutual recognition in the Phenomenology (which ultimately conceptualises such recognition in 
the  form  of  absolute  knowledge)  suggests  certain  difficulties  in  Hegel’s  working  through  of  the 
problem of  identity and difference within the speculative system as a whole.
            Chapter Four explores Hegel’s critical presentation of  the categories of  identity and difference, 
the suspension of  the logic of  essence or reflection into the logic of  conceptuality. The enormous 
topic  is  confined to the  parameters  of  the problem of  identity  and difference;  hence this  chapter 
concentrates  on  analyses  of  specific  sections  of  Hegel’s  Science  of  Logic  without  attempting  any 
comprehensive  overview.  The chapter  considers  the  analysis  of  determinate  being,  something  and 
other, in the Logic of  Being; the movement of  identity, difference, contradiction, and ground in the 
Logic  of  Essence;  and  the  meaning  of  the  speculative  unity  of  universality,  particularity,  and 
individuality, in the Logic of  the Concept. The organising theme is that Hegel attempts to suspend 
both substance- and subject-metaphysics within his speculative logic, and that this project is driven by 
the need to think the “identity of  identity  and non-identity,” or self-grounding freedom of  self  in 
otherness, that metaphysics hitherto has failed to comprehend. Hegel’s critical confrontation with the 
logic of  the metaphysical tradition and of  modern philosophy is driven by the need to overcome the 
objectifying tendencies of  thing-ontology and the potential for domination-relations connected with 
the subject-object paradigm of  modern metaphysics. Speculative Logic ultimately aims to be a logic of  
freedom understood as  self-being  in  otherness.  The question  of  Hegel’s  success  or  failure  in  this 
Logical project of  overcoming metaphysics allows us to make a transition to Heidegger’s confrontation 
with metaphysics and modernity.
            Part III turns specifically to Heidegger’s contributions to the philosophical problem of  identity 
and difference, and explores Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel in the context of  Heidegger’s own 
attempt  at  a  “non-metaphysical”  rethinking  of  identity  and difference  in  the  relationship  between 
human beings and Being. This “ontopoetic” thinking of  a non-grounding experience of  the unity of  
human beings and Being, for Heidegger, points to the possibility of  a new experience of  Being as event 
of  appropriation [Er-eignis]  beyond the essence of  modern technology.  I  shall  argue,  however,  that 
Heidegger’s  critique  of  Hegel  remains  “onesided”  in  that  it  does  not  acknowledge  Hegel’s  own 
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speculative  treatment  of  (ontological)  difference,  fails  to  acknowledge  Hegel’s  thinking  of  
intersubjective  recognition,  and  misconstrues  the  hermeneutics  of  Hegel’s  reading  the  history  of  
philosophy. Despite his  avowed project  of  thinking the (ontological)  difference as such, Heidegger 
ultimately  emphasises  a  (non-metaphysically  thought)  unity  or  identity.  Heidegger’s  non-grounding, 
ontopoetic thought, however, eschews any explicit conceptual or grounding account of  the relationship 
between identity and difference as such.
            Heidegger’s  task  of  thinking  the  question  of  Being  is  introduced  in  Chapter  Five,  which 
examines Heidegger’s brief  critique of  Hegel’s conception of  time and Spirit within the context of  
Heidegger’s  project  of  fundamental  ontology.  The  chapter  then  develops  a  critical  analysis  of  
Heidegger’s  onto-ego-logical  or  Cartesian-Fichtean  interpretation  of  Hegel  as  an  exemplar  of  the 
culmination of  modern subject-metaphysics.  The validity  of  Heidegger’s  interpretations  takes on a 
crucial significance, since Heidegger’s criticisms of  the metaphysics of  modernity gives a decisive role 
to Hegel. I shall explore the thesis that the difficulties of  Heidegger’s reading of  Hegel arise from his 
narrow construal  of  the  metaphysical  bases  of  modernity,  above  all  in  regard  to  the  meaning  of  
autonomous subjectivity and possibilities of  historical intersubjectivity.
            Chapter Six considers the later Heidegger’s own project for thinking the identity and difference 
between human being and Being in an “ungrounded,” non-metaphysical manner. The theme organising 
this chapter is the problem of  the ontological difference as it emerges and is transformed throughout 
Heidegger’s “path of  thinking”. In particular, I discuss Heidegger’s shift from the problem of  thinking 
the difference between Being and beings, presupposed but obliterated by metaphysics, to preparing for 
a  non-metaphysical  thinking  of  the  truth  of  Being  as  appropriative  event.  These  issues  will  be 
addressed in Heidegger’s most explicit essays on our topic, “Identity and Difference,” and “The Onto-
Theological Constitution of  Metaphysics”. These essays also represent Heidegger’s mature relationship 
with Hegel, no longer a polemical opposition or deconstructive overcoming but rather an “enveloping 
appropriation” (Souche-Dagues 1992, 247). Heidegger attempts to develop a “thinking conversation” 
or dialogue with Hegel concerning identity and difference which attempts to elaborate the task of  
thinking through a recovery [Verwindung] of  (and from) metaphysics in modernity. Heidegger’s proposal 
is that the modern experience of  Being as technology, whose essence is the universal en-framing or Ge-
stell, opens up the possibility of  another, non-metaphysical experience of  the event of  appropriation 
[Er-eignis] between human beings and Being.
            Heidegger’s  account  of  the  relationship  between  technology  and  the  appropriative  event 
remains confusingly obscure. Can Heidegger maintain a ‘critical’ stance towards modernity as the epoch 
of  global  technology without acknowledging the role of  self-willing  subjectivity  within this  critical 
relationship? Or does the attitude of  releasement [Gelassenheit] entail an abandonment of  any critical 
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relationship  to  the  way  Being  discloses  itself,  a  fatalistic  submission  to  the  inscrutable  sendings 
[Schickungen]  of  Being  itself ?  Heidegger’s  thinking  of  identity  and  difference,  I  contend,  remains 
onesided  in  that  it  does  not  articulate  the  relationship  between  the  ontological  difference  as  the 
unthought element of  metaphysics up to Hegel, and the non-metaphysically conceived identity between 
Being,  man, and beings.  Heidegger’s alternative to Hegel’s  thinking of  freedom in modernity is  to 
promote  an ontopoetic  attitude of  “releasement”  towards  the  appropriative  event,  an event  about 
which ultimately nothing can be known, over which we have no control, and which presents itself  as an 
obscure historical destiny.[49] The difficulty Heidegger faces is that to articulate any account of  this 
event  of  appropriation  means  to  speak  of  it  as  something,  and  hence  in  terms  of  the  way  it  is 
manifested through beings or human beings: the attempt to think the (ontological) difference as such 
cannot avoid having recourse to the discourse of  identity or else to a speculative discourse which strives 
to supersede the paradigm of  reflection.
            In conclusion,  I  suggest  that  Hegel’s  treatment  of  the  identity/difference problem—recast 
within the problematic  of  intersubjective recognition—offers  further possibilities  for contemporary 
thought. For the difference between the Hegelian and Heideggerian critiques of  metaphysics ultimately 
rests on their differing attitudes to the project of  modernity. Hegel’s critical justification of  modernity 
exposes its limitations but nonetheless aims at a dialectical suspension and preservation of  its historical 
and social  achievements.  Heidegger’s overcoming of  the metaphysical foundations of  modernity in 
favour of  an onto-poetic releasement from the grip of  modern technology abandons the legacy and 
horizon of  modernity itself. While Hegel’s project suffers from the difficulty of  attempting to force the 
comprehension of  modernity  into  the  metaphysical  closure  of  the  speculative  system,  Heidegger’s 
onto-poetic  path  suffers  from the problem that  Hegel  strove  to  overcome:  it  does  not  provide  a 
conceptually articulated account of  the relationship between (non-metaphysically conceived) identity 
and difference. A critical rethinking of  Hegel’s legacy can therefore enable us to critically appropriate 
Heidegger’s  critique  of  metaphysics,  to  understand  more  deeply  the  origins  of  the  contemporary 
discourse of  identity and difference, and to suggest other paths for thinking through the experience of  
modernity.
[1] See Beierwaltes (1980) for a useful conceptual-historical reconstruction of  the problem of  identity 
and difference. His account emphasises the neglected role of  figures in Neoplatonism (Plotinus, 
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[2] Cf. Gasché: “Were one to write a general philosophical history of  the concept of  difference, one 
might be tempted to view it as the history of  the progressive emancipation of  difference from identity. 
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“metaphysical” aspects of  the problem of  identity and difference central to the Hegel-Heidegger 
debate.
[5] Recent works on the Hegel-Heidegger relationship include: R. Comay and J. McCumber eds. (1999), 
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remark concerning the proximity of  différance and Heidegger’s thought of  Being and the ontological 
difference between Being and beings (1982, 22), while the “relations of  profound affinity” between 
différance and Hegelian dialectics signal the “infinitesimal and radical displacement” it attempts to 
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and of  grounding in the sense of  a representing subjectivity” (1989, 64), and for its forgetting of  the 
practical-moral significance of  relationship to the Other in modern philosophy since Kant. Heidegger 
thus “leads the intellectual monologue of  modern philosophy to its conclusion” (1989, 72). 
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of  history,” but Marx does not elaborate how this experience of  “diremption”, and “contradiction” is 
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concept” (1988, 13).
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thinking from within.” (2000: 4).
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special challenge to Heidegger’s own effort to legitimate a phenomenological ontology of  finite Being” 
(1988: 15). However, Schmidt does not discuss Hegel’s analysis of  the categories of  finitude nor his 
conception of  the “true” versus the “spurious” infinite. This omission makes it difficult to establish a 
“dialogue” between Hegel and Heidegger.
[27] Schmidt remarks that “Heidegger’s work belongs essentially to the historical debate that is still 
carried on today: the debate arising from the problems and unresolved questions of  modernity and the 
claims of  postmodernity. Heidegger, like the best of  his predecessors in this debate, recognised Hegel 
as the Janus-faced figure he is and so as sitting squarely in the interstices opened up by the historical 
clash between modernity and postmodernity, metaphysics and its overcoming.” (14, cf. 20).
[28] Cf. “I will try to show that [Heidegger’s] interpretation of  Hegel is always based—even though 
this is often far from explicit—on the idea of  a temporality which sheds the light that allows the being 
of  beings to appear as itself  or not as itself ” (De Boer 2000, 199).
[29] Cf. de Boer (2000, 255-262). Cf. fn.27 376-378, which takes issue with other interpretations of  
Heidegger’s critique of  Hegel’s concept of  time as now-time.
[30] Cf. “I am convinced that Heidegger wanted to show how Hegel’s methodical principle is grounded 
in a temporal projective preconception in which Present overshadows the proper character of  the other 
ecstases.” (de Boer 2000, 276).
[31] De Boer acknowledges that “[Heidegger’s] deconstruction of  Hegel’s philosophy, although not 
really elaborated, can serve as an example of  his attempt to overcome the narrow perspective of  
metaphysics” (2000, 5); but she also claims that, given Heidegger’s oblique remarks on the Science of  
Logic, “one may doubt whether he intensively studied the entire work” (2000, 200). This is a serious 
failing, given that de Boer sees Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel to be centred on “the meaning of  
dialectic, negativity, and movement” (2000, 199) as these are developed in Hegel’s Logic.
[32] Cf. “Heidegger regards the absolute as the greatest self-alienation of  being. The question is, 
however, whether Heidegger does not thus necessarily take up a standpoint that is even more absolute 
than that of  Hegel. For how can Heidegger see more than Hegel without thereby denying the finitude 
of  every insight?” (2000, 310). De Boer’s answer to this question is ambiguous: Heidegger, on the one 
hand, “designates his own thinking as the only thinking which no longer depends on what it does not 
itself  have within itself,” a sign of  metaphysical hubris. On the other, “[t]he temporal principle that 
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guides Heidegger’s thinking makes every self-sufficiency impossible; it is a ground that continually 
threatens to fall apart” (2000, 311). This ambiguity between Heidegger’s metaphysical hubris and his 
commitment to the finitude of  ‘groundless’ thinking leaves undecided the question of  whether 
Heidegger successfully overcomes Hegelian speculative thought.  
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and bureaucratic state organisation; it has a cultural meaning, defined by the development of  
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tradition, particularly, first, in the work of  Kant and Hegel, and then in two thinkers greatly influenced 
by if  highly critical of  that tradition, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger” (Pippin 1991, 9-10). 
For Kolb, although Hegel and Heidegger share “the same overall strategy in approaching modernity, 
they came to quite different results”; by examining the Hegelian and Heideggerian approaches, “we can 
learn better the possibilities and pitfalls of  that approach to modernity” (1986, xii). See also the recent 
debate between Pippin and Kolb (1999).
[35] See Taylor (1975), Hartmann (1966, 1976), Wood (1991), Williams (1997). Woods’ strictly “non-
metaphysical” interpretation attempts to salvage the “useful” and “relevant” aspects of  Hegel’s ethical 
and political thought from the “total failure” that is Hegel’s Logic. Williams suggests that Kolb’s focus 
on the logic and the logical relation between civil society and the state means that he tends to neglect 
the deeper sense of  recognition involved in ethical life and the state (1997, 4).
[36] Kolb maintains that Hegel can to some extent be regarded as metaphysician of  subjectness—in the 
demand for grounding and self-coincidence—but not of  subjectivity in the sense of  the egological 
interpretation of  Being as grounded in self-certain representation (1986, xiv).
[37] Cf. “Our problem is to keep something like Hegel’s motion and mutual relation while foregoing 
his closure and self-transparency. He worked hard, however, to make these inseparable, and we cannot 
just accept part of  his system. Its basic ideas need to be rethought” (1986, 286 fn.8).
[38] Kolb asks: “to what degree does the ontological difference involve a distinction of  form from 
content, and to what degree must it involve immediacy and unity in the meaning of  being granted to 
us?” (1986, 287 fn. 14). Answering this question would require a detailed analysis of  Heidegger’s 
criticism of  metaphysics, and investigating further Heidegger’s emphasis on unity within our modern 
experience of  Being as technology. 
[39] Nietzsche is Hegel’s most “problematic opponent,” the thinker who most radically challenges the 
legitimacy of  the modernist project of  rational “self-reassurance” (1991, 15).
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[40] Pippin argues that “the emergence of  the sensibility promoted by Heidegger—the dependence of  
any human self-assertion on ‘principles’ that are themselves mere events or historical happenings—
cannot itself  be viewed ‘dogmatically,’ as a discovery, or truth or epoch-ending disclosure by Being” 
(1991, 140).
[41] From Pippin’s point of  view, “it would never be possible to speak simply of  ‘the’ technological 
event or enframing. There could be no such thing as, simply, ‘technology,’ or Machenschaft, but only 
differing, historically situated, socially mediated experiences of  human power and limitation, a 
‘technology’ appropriate to a certain social and economic order, experienced within a certain ‘ethical 
life,’ and differing from a technology expressing and functioning within a different historical 
community” (1991, 146).
[42] In other words, “a return to a view that such an event should not be understood as a 
contemporary social achievement, the self-construal of  a historical community, but as a “mittence,” a 
gift “from” Being, or as a directly apprehensible event” (Pippin 1991, 140).
[43] Pippin remarks that this barely touches on the basic issue between Hegel and Heidegger: namely 
“Heidegger’s charge that Hegel is the supreme philosopher of  ‘identity,’ and that Heidegger alone has 
formulated the true ‘matter of  thinking,’ “difference as difference.’ The Hegelian response would 
involve an interpretation of  Hegel’s central principle: ‘being a self ’ in another.” (1991, 197 fn.112). This 
central issue is not explicitly thematised in Pippin’s study; both the Heideggerian critique of  Hegel and 
Hegelian defence of  modernity within the context of  the identity/difference problem “are matters for 
future discussion” (1991, 197 fn.112).
[44] Kolb’s study has the tendency to compare and contrast Hegel and Heidegger as offering equally 
useful ‘resources’ for understanding modernity: “If  I had to choose, I would pick Heidegger’s 
deconstructive living over Hegel’s justified life, but for looking at situations in detail it is more helpful 
to mine the fragments of  Hegel’s system” (1986, xii).
[45] See Haar (1999, 45-56) for a discussion of  the question of  the convergences and divergences 
between Hegel’s history of  spirit and Heidegger’s history of  Being. See also Lammi (1997, 43-58) for an 
account of  the dispute between Hegel and Heidegger over the meaning of  (hermeneutical) experience, 
and Redding’s hermeneutic approach to Hegel (1996).
[46] Cf. Hegel’s famous remark on the refutation of  Spinozism: “The genuine refutation must 
penetrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained by 
attacking him somewhere else and defeating him where he is not”. (WL II 15/581).
[47] Janicaud (1999, 26-44), Taminiaux, (1985, 79-90), Bernasconi (1985, 1-13). Cf. Taminiaux’s remark: 
“by what right can the confrontation of  Heidegger with Hegel be fixed in the form of  a judgment that 
the former makes at a distance about the latter, so that the judge is neatly separable from the judged, 
when the longest of  the works where this confrontation plays itself  out [Heidegger’s “Hegel’s Concept 
of  Experience” — R.S.], far from establishing this distance and this separation, expressedly endeavours 
“to seek help from the support Hegel offers”?” (1985, 80).
[48] Hegel’s Jena logic provides important background for understanding the unfolding of  the PhG. 
See Horstmann (1977) (1980).
[49] Heidegger’s response to modern nihilism—the Gelassenheit towards the event of  appropriation—
raises the question whether it escapes the very nihilism that it would passively dissolve. See Rosen 
(1993).
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